By Dr. Jarrett Leplin (auth.)
This e-book proposes an unique thought of epistemic justification that provides a brand new option to relate justification to the epistemic target of truth-conducive trust. the idea relies on a unique research of trustworthy belief-formation that solutions vintage objections to reliability theories in epistemology. The research generates a manner of distinguishing justified trust from believing justifiedly, such that inerrant belief-formation needn't be justificatory while systemic deception will be. It thereby respects the instinct that criteria for justification has to be obtainable to the believer, whereas keeping the basic connection of justification to truth.
The research indicates how justification pertains to, yet is distinctive from, facts, rationality, and chance. It presents a unifying therapy of matters critical to present debate in epistemology, together with epistemic paradoxes, epistemic closure, skepticism, contextualism, advantage theories, the impact of good fortune on wisdom and justification, the translation of subjunctive stipulations for justification, the clash among internalism and externalism, and metaphilosophical assessment of epistemological theories. There are extra purposes to metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of technological know-how, and ethics.
The ebook will have interaction philosophers operating in epistemology or similar fields, and their graduate students.
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Extra resources for A Theory of Epistemic Justification
Gwendolen blames herself for her husband’s death, because she blames herself for having wished him dead. At the same time, she believes this selfcondemnation to be excessively harsh. 26 2 Truth-Conduciveness holds that one may justifiedly misjudge one’s justificatory status; justification has not been internalized. For even if one must be able to do whatever is one’s duty, even if one cannot have duties that one is unable to perform, it does not follow that one must be able to determine whether one’s duty has been done nor what one’s duty is.
But even if your agenda is knowledge rather than truth, I do not think you can build truth into justification. Knowledge is partly metaphysical, requiring the cooperation of the world, and cannot be explicated entirely in epistemic terms. What you can do, with knowledge your target, is limit consideration to justified truths. But then, as observed in Chapter 1, you are bypassing the concept of justification as such. You do not need a general theory of justification. As known propositions are true, it suffices for you to say what it takes for truths to be justified.
Our method yields lots of truth and little falsity; in investing credence reliably, the preponderance of truth over falsity is high. 1 The other way emphasizes avoidance of error. While not infallible, reliably formed beliefs can be counted on rarely if ever to be false, 1 As I have noted, Goldman also applies the term ‘reliability’ to subjunctive conditions for knowledge (1976). Ernest Sosa and William Alston (1995) are further proponents of the probabilistic interpretation. Sosa’s position(s) will be considered in Chapter 9.